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The Return of Protectionism to 
Japan and the United States
The Manchurian Example
Hisashi HARATA
University of Tokyo
On 20th Feb. 2017 @ Michigan Law School
“Manchuria”
Three Eastern Provinces of China
Introduction
• Manchuria
• What was the turning-point for Japan & U.S.?
• Mismatch of the title?
Protectionism:
Closing door for domestic industries
Basis of idea: Exclusivism for national interests
• Problem: Combination between             
exclusivism and expansionism
in a third unstable country= risk of war
Historical Outlook
• Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895
• Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905
Portsmouth Treaty
• Twenty-one Demands and Sino-Japanese 
Agreement of 1914
• New China Consortium in 1920
• Washington Conference
Possibility and Failure of Int’l cooperation
• Manchurian Incident in 1931 
• Proclamation of Manchukuo in 1932
Keyword: “Open Door”
• Two declarations of Secretary of State, Hay in 1899 
and 1900
Two principles:
1) Respect of integrity of China’s territorial 
sovereignty
2) Equal opportunity of economic activities in China 
for all foreigners
Crystalized in Washington Conference & Consortium
New Four-Power Int’l Banking 
Consortium Agreement in 1920
• Main purpose
to eliminate undesirable competition, and 
“to assist China in the establishment of her great 
public utilities …”.
• Essential mechanism: Pooling vested rights 
and priorities of banking groups
Esp. prior options of financial loans
Failure of Consortium
• No positive achievement: No loan realized
• Negative achievement: 
Japan’s active imperialism prevented
• Unsettled critical issue [Point of today’s talk!]
How and what socio-economic structure to 
implement in Manchuria?
Main obstacle: Instability in China
Unstable China
• In 1911 Chinese revolution
Chinese Republic    (X Ch’ing dynasty)
• In 1916 Yuan Shi Kai’s death
Central government---disorganized and disrupted
Local disorder--- warlords ruling
• In 1920’s  Chinese Nationalism
Anti-Japanese Imperialism
especially in Manchuria
• Communism
Difficulties in China
• Fiscal difficulty of central government
Unwillingness of loan to China
• Manchuria: Chinese Economic Nationalism
Social Instability: boycott, labor disputes etc.
Chinese initiative of railway construction
encircling railway net against S.M.R.
• Railway business not appropriate for market
Need but absence of arrangement 
Japan’s advance into Manchuria in 1920’s
Takashi Hara (1856-1921)
First commoner prime minister
Disarmament
Fiscal Austerity
Gold Standard 
Adhesion to int’l new order
New China Consortium
Eastern Conference in 1921
• Diplomatic Policy on Far East Asia
1) Adhesion to the new world order
2) Extension of  Japan’s railways in North Manchuria 
(former Russian ruled area)
(Active Imperialism?)
3) Southern Manchuria
Support for Chang Tso-lin (Open Door?)
for stable business by S.M.R. Company
etc.
S.M.R. Company with Matsuoka
Southern M. Railway Company
incorporated in 1906
Government  50％ shareholding
Apparently pure private corp.
Yosuke Matsuoka (1880-1946)
Chinese railway construction
Cooperation with Chang Tso-lin
Call for U.S. & British finance
but Refusal of direct investment
Manchuria as Japan’s “lifeline”
U.S. position on Manchuria in 1920
• Unsuccessful attempts of railway encroachment
Mr. Harriman, U.S. banks’ railway agreement
• U.S. government: refrain from exclusive 
expansionism
• U.S. banks, e.g. J.P. Morgan
unwilling to grant loan to China but
willing to cooperate with Japan, SMR & OCC.
Contrast of U.S. position to SMR and OCC
Oriental Colonization Company
• Incorporated in 1907
• Shift to land credit in Manchuria
• Financing Sino-Japanese joint ventures
Colony city construction (Mukden, Dairen etc.)
Railway construction
Iron/Coal mining
Power Plant 
---Collaboration with SMR
1923 Bond Issue in U.S.   National City Bank of N.Y.
SMR’s attempt of bond issue
• In 1920   Refused by Department of State
General Principle:
not supporting foreign competitors
• In 1927 Renegotiation:
Kellogg’s implicit acknowledgement
But public opinion & Standard Oil’s demand
U.S. Government’s attitude changed:
Q: General Principle changed?   
Unpredictable discretion 
OCC’s success again in 1928
• Successful bond issue in U.S.
Strong opposition of U.S. public opinion
but
with the limitation of usage of funds
only for redemption of
issued domestic bonds and 
sort-term loans
U.S. Department of State’s approval
No apparent contradiction 
with Consortium Agreement 
(but room for manipulation)
Congruent with Open Door Policy?
• U.S. banks intention of financial support 
• U.S. government’s attitude
to OCC, with limitation (reasonable?)
to SMR (general principle changed?)
Any clear difference between OCC and SMR?
All congruent with Open Door Policy?
Different actors: portfolio investment /direct investment
1) financial profit oriented banks (& Dep. of State)
2) protection of domestic industry
Dep. of Commerce  (H. Hoover)
other banks        
Different justification for Japan’s 
“special position” in Manchuria
• Geographic particularity for national defense 
and economic existence.
• “Right to Live”
• Revision of Imperial Defense Plan in 1923
U.S. as hypothetical adversary country
Urgent need to prepare for war  
• Right of investment-return
• Keep of peace and order 
not only for Japanese but for foreigners
Conclusive Remark
• Prime Minister Hara’s concept of “open door”
• Difference from U.S. Open Door Policy
• Unsettled issue on Manchuria (or China)
Local stability (political and military)
Direct investment & Portfolio investment

Consortium Agreement
• General Assurance for Japan’s interest
“the consortium does not intend to encroach on any industrial 
enterprises which are already established nor expects that existing 
Japanese options for the continuation of such enterprises be pooled.”
Lansing (The Secretary of State) on October 29, 1919
• Dual Characteristic of Agreement 
Agreement between private banking groups
But negotiation involving national governments
Not purely private deal but diplomatic implication
• Double difficulties for China loans
Inter-national relations: diplomatic concerns
Profitability for banks
and also Components and conflicts in a banking group      ex. U.S. 
Cotton Wheat Loan 1933
• U.S. RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation)
50,000,000 USD loan to Chinese government
for the purchase of Cotton Wheat from U.S.
= for U.S. domestic economic reconstruction
= for supporting Chinese central government
• No notice & approval of Department of State
Department of Commerce’s initiative
(another ex. promotion of pilot contract 
for export of U.S. airplanes)                  
